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"Morality and the Mind"
Oct. 18th, 2010 04:57 pmThis past weekend, I attended most of the talks at the "Morality and the Mind" symposium hosted by The Center for Cognitive Sciences and the Institute for Global Leadership here at Tufts:
http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/programs/special/morality-and-mind
It was a very thought-provoking series of talks, with an interesting format, designed to bring cognitive scientists together with policy people to talk about the science of morality and what it might teach us about public policy and international relations.
The program started with a general introduction by Professor Ray Jackendoff, laying the framework for the cognitive science examinations of morality, followed by a series of policy-makers introducing themselves, their interest in the cognitive science of morality, and what they hoped to learn from the symposium. The rest of the event consisted of presentations by scientists and other technical specialists, with interspersed commentary and responses by the policy-makers.
It's hard to select favorite moments, but a few highlights for me included: Dr. Laurie Santos' research on the evolution of human morals, based on moral behaviors that are present (and absent!) in brown capuchin monkeys; Dr. Samuel Bowles' talk on situations in which financial incentives actually decrease altruistic behaviors and (perhaps most interestingly) when they don't -- it seems that respectful communication is key; and Leon Fuerth's thoughtful response to the symposium as a whole. I also really enjoyed Dr. Marchel Kinsbourne's remarks on what he described as a "creeping dualism" that finds its way into the language of self-proclaimed philosophical materialists, which comes out as statements along the lines of "my brain made me do it."
I unfortunately missed Dr. Paul Bloom's talk, which examined moral behaviors in human infants. Based on references by later speakers, it sounds like it was a really informative one.
I'm really intrigued by the hypothesis that Dr. Jackendoff presented and that Dr. John Mikhail described in more detail. The general idea is that just as humans have an innate capacity for language, which develops into the ability to parse specific languages encountered in infancy, humans might also have an innate capacity for moral reasoning, which is shaped by the moral environment experienced by an infant. The implication is that we are unable to change our moral values once they have been established, because they are so deeply and unconsciously integrated into how we think.
The last response of the symposium was by Dr. Pervez Hoodboy, a Pakistani physicist, who posed the question whether there didn't have to be some sort of exception made to explain how people can be convinced by rational argument to change their minds. Dr. Kinsbourne's answer was that what appear to be radical changes of opinion or philosophy, e.g. from hard-line liberal to hard-line conservative or vice versa, what has actually happened is that the person has discovered that some of their unconsciously held morals contradict other of their unconscious morals, and they must somehow resolve this discrepancy.
If this is so, I believe that the lesson for those of us who might wish to change the minds of others is to start by determining what deeply held values we have in common.
http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/programs/special/morality-and-mind
It was a very thought-provoking series of talks, with an interesting format, designed to bring cognitive scientists together with policy people to talk about the science of morality and what it might teach us about public policy and international relations.
The program started with a general introduction by Professor Ray Jackendoff, laying the framework for the cognitive science examinations of morality, followed by a series of policy-makers introducing themselves, their interest in the cognitive science of morality, and what they hoped to learn from the symposium. The rest of the event consisted of presentations by scientists and other technical specialists, with interspersed commentary and responses by the policy-makers.
It's hard to select favorite moments, but a few highlights for me included: Dr. Laurie Santos' research on the evolution of human morals, based on moral behaviors that are present (and absent!) in brown capuchin monkeys; Dr. Samuel Bowles' talk on situations in which financial incentives actually decrease altruistic behaviors and (perhaps most interestingly) when they don't -- it seems that respectful communication is key; and Leon Fuerth's thoughtful response to the symposium as a whole. I also really enjoyed Dr. Marchel Kinsbourne's remarks on what he described as a "creeping dualism" that finds its way into the language of self-proclaimed philosophical materialists, which comes out as statements along the lines of "my brain made me do it."
I unfortunately missed Dr. Paul Bloom's talk, which examined moral behaviors in human infants. Based on references by later speakers, it sounds like it was a really informative one.
I'm really intrigued by the hypothesis that Dr. Jackendoff presented and that Dr. John Mikhail described in more detail. The general idea is that just as humans have an innate capacity for language, which develops into the ability to parse specific languages encountered in infancy, humans might also have an innate capacity for moral reasoning, which is shaped by the moral environment experienced by an infant. The implication is that we are unable to change our moral values once they have been established, because they are so deeply and unconsciously integrated into how we think.
The last response of the symposium was by Dr. Pervez Hoodboy, a Pakistani physicist, who posed the question whether there didn't have to be some sort of exception made to explain how people can be convinced by rational argument to change their minds. Dr. Kinsbourne's answer was that what appear to be radical changes of opinion or philosophy, e.g. from hard-line liberal to hard-line conservative or vice versa, what has actually happened is that the person has discovered that some of their unconsciously held morals contradict other of their unconscious morals, and they must somehow resolve this discrepancy.
If this is so, I believe that the lesson for those of us who might wish to change the minds of others is to start by determining what deeply held values we have in common.